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DD/S&T-2917-66

1 June 1966

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While the experiments are interest the paper by
While the experiments are interesting and worthwhile,
I have prear to me to be more related to the potential attack aspect
indications rather than to the preparation for attack aspect, this
hatter being, in my view, of more immediate national interest while
the former might be considered of priority military interest. The
differentiation is not great, however. Another way of saying it is
the inputs to his hypothetical process are really the outputs of
our indications work, while his outputs are the judgments which in
I like are being made by very senior Government officials (Sec.
Demse, the President). Thus, his experiment directly applies to
to would call cabinet-level judgments. The application of his
experimental techniques to our indications integration process would
very analyprove interesting and useful, but as yet he and we are
from knowing just how useful they might be.

2. There are some difficulties in his or our experimenting theoretically sound methods; first, simulation of our problemant leave questions as to the applicability to real life, and, second, experimenting with real data would seriously perturb our system, both from a security sense and from a day-to-day operational sense. As you know, my own private theory is that a working system, however theoretically deficient, can only be improved incrementally and in a slow explution, such changes hopefully leading in the direction of a utopian goal. I do not believe that a major revolutionary change is always estrable or possible.

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3. In spite of the rather negative tone up till now, I think is worthwhile to have come and talk to us, primarily to help us define our utopian long range goal, but also to advise as to the best incremental steps toward that goal. Where we arrived in 1966 with respect to satellite photography, collection, processing interpretation and analysis, is probably not the result of a carefully defined goal back in 1960, rather a "growth-like-topsy" process resced by individual and largely uncoordinated actions all along the lime. The next five years will see a similar information explosion in our technical capability for observing essentially all of the electromàgnetic environment over large geography areas in near real time. How we process; interpret, and analyze this information is a serious problem. These steps are different enough from those ith photos (and in fact from those used in the microscopic sampling of today) to deserve considerable study. If can be convinced that this and other sub-problems are

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im containt parts of his "national decision" approach, he could help us.

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4. It might be worthwhile for J. J. Hitchcock and myself to have a preliminary conversation with prior to his being invited here.



Chief, Systems Analysis Staff DD/S&T

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